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onetary policy is typically undertaken with an eye to achiev-
ing a select few objectives in the long run. In the United
States, the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy to pro-
mote two long-run goals: price stability and sustainable economic
growth. In many other countries, central banks have a single long-run
goal defined in terms of an inflation target. Yet while central banks have
narrowly defined long-run goals, most monitor a wide range of eco-
nomic indicators. 
Why do central banks collect and analyze so many indicators? To
understand the answer, it is first important to recognize that monetary
policy affects economic activity and inflation with long and variable lags.
One consequence of the lagged response is that central banks cannot
undertake policy actions to immediately realize their inflation or output
goals. A second consequence is that the magnitudes of economic
responses to policy actions cannot be estimated with precision. Thus,
policymakers face the difficult task of taking forward-looking policy
actions when they cannot be certain about the magnitudes of the eco-
nomic implications of their actions. To cope with this uncertainty, cen-
tral banks search for economic indicators that may be closely related to
policy’s long-term goals. 
Sharon Kozicki is an assistant vice president and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City. Matthew Cardillo, a research associate at the bank, helped prepare the article.
This article draws on Kozicki and Buskas (2000). This article is on the bank’s website at
www.kc.frb.org.
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This article presents multicountry empirical evidence to assess
whether any single indicator reliably predicts inflation. If such an indi-
cator exists, it would need to perform adequately under a wide variety
of economic conditions and changing economic structures, because no
country faces an unchanging economic environment. One way to test
for such robust performance is to examine the value of indicators across
a variety of countries experiencing different economic conditions, finan-
cial structures, policy shifts, and so forth.
The first section discusses why several widely used indicators might
predict inflation. The second section explains how the predictive per-
formance of these indicators can be compared. The third section reports
empirical results for 11 developed economies, including the United
States. The article concludes that while monitoring the change in GDP
growth is useful on average across countries, no single economic indica-
tor is always reliable. This evidence supports an approach to policymak-
ing that involves monitoring a wide range of economic indicators.
I. POTENTIAL INDICATORS
OF INFLATIONARY PRESSURES
Many economic indicators may help predict inflation. For instance,
a recent study on forecasting U.S. inflation examined 168 variables
(Stock and Watson 1999). Rather than cast such a wide net, this article
limits the list of indicators to those that are more closely linked to infla-
tion by economic theory or that have been regularly used in previous
empirical studies. In addition, because the analysis is done for a collec-
tion of industrialized countries, data availability imposes further limita-
tions on the variables that may be analyzed.1 Consequently, the
indicators discussed in this section are likely only a subset of the eco-
nomic variables monitored by policymakers. Nevertheless, the chosen
indicators have broad coverage.
This section reviews reasons why these indicator variables might be
expected to predict inflation. The indicators fall into two basic groups.
One group includes financial variables that might predict inflation
because they reflect current or expected monetary policy actions. This
group includes variables such as interest rates, money growth, and
exchange rates. The second group includes measures of real economic
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activity which might predict inflation because they provide information
on excess demand conditions in the economy. This group includes vari-
ables such as the unemployment rate and real GDP growth.
Interest rates
Most central banks conduct monetary policy by setting or targeting
an overnight interest rate or another short-term rate. Increases in these
interest rates are generally regarded as tightenings of monetary condi-
tions and are expected to slow economic activity and decrease inflation-
ary pressures. Decreases in these rates are easings of monetary
conditions and are expected to boost real economic activity and possibly
increase inflationary pressures. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that
when the Federal Reserve has held down interest rates in the face of
demand pressures, inflation has accelerated (Dewald).
Interest rates are not, however, a clear signal of the stance of mone-
tary policy. Interest rates contain an expected inflation component and a
real interest rate component. A specific value of a short-term interest
rate may reflect relatively tight monetary policy if expected inflation is
low or relatively accommodative monetary policy if expected inflation is
high. For a similar reason, rising interest rates may not signal a tighten-
ing of monetary policy and falling interest rates may not signal an eas-
ing of policy. For example, if expected inflation increases by more than
an increase in interest rates, then policy might be viewed as less tight.
One approach to controlling for expected inflation is to use real
interest rates rather than nominal interest rates as a potential indicator
of future inflation. Real interest rates, constructed as nominal interest
rates less expected inflation, do not suffer from the difficulties associated
with the expected inflation component of nominal interest rates. Conse-
quently, short-term real interest rates may provide a better measure of
the stance of monetary policy and, therefore, may be a better predictor
of inflation than nominal interest rates. Nevertheless, real interest rates
are also likely to be an imperfect indicator of future inflation. The level
of real rates consistent with flat inflation (that is, the equilibrium real
rate) may change over time. Thus, an increase in real interest rates may
not reflect a tightening of monetary policy if the equilibrium real rate
also increases. 
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A second approach to controlling for expected inflation is to use the
spread between a long-term interest rate and a short-term interest rate
as a measure of the stance of monetary policy. Because long-term inter-
est rates move with changes in expected inflation, they are often
regarded as a reasonable benchmark to control for the level of expected
inflation. When monetary policy is tightened, short-term interest rates
rise. Although long-term interest rates may react to policy, they rarely
rise one-for-one with short-term interest rate increases. As a result, the
spread usually falls when monetary policy is tightened, indicating a
likely decrease in future inflation.2
Long-term interest rates may also help predict inflation on their
own. Nominal long-term interest rates incorporate market expectations
of inflation over a long horizon. An increase in the market’s expectation
of inflation, all else equal, will lead to an increase in long-term interest
rates. Consequently, if market expectations of inflation are correct on
average, changes in long-term interest rates may signal a change in
future inflation in the same direction.3
Movements in long-term interest rates may, however, occur without
changes in expected inflation. Such shifts draw into question the predic-
tive power of long-term interest rates and interest rate spreads for
future inflation. For instance, long-term interest rates contain liquidity
premiums that may rise when market participants become more uncer-
tain about the outlook for interest rates. Additionally, long-term rates
may shift with changes in the relative supply and demand for long-
maturity securities.4
Money growth
Although central banks conduct monetary policy by targeting or
setting a short-term interest rate, some central banks have chosen to use
an intermediate target, such as money growth, to guide monetary pol-
icy.5 Analysts generally agree that money growth and inflation are
linked. Countries with relatively rapid increases in their money stocks
tend to have relatively high inflation rates, and vice versa (McCandless
and Weber). Additionally, there are no examples in history of substantial
inflations lasting for more than a brief period that were not accompa-
nied by roughly corresponding rapid increases in the quantity of money
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(Friedman 1992; Dewald). Furthermore, a number of historical episodes
support the view that money growth is the cause and inflation the
effect.6
Numerous studies have found empirical evidence suggesting that
money growth explains inflation.7 Recently, however, several studies
have suggested that the predictive power of money growth for inflation
has waned. While monetary aggregates may once have captured infor-
mation important in predicting inflation, some analysts suggest they are
no longer reliable predictors.8
Exchange rates
The exchange rate is another financial variable used by many cen-
tral banks as a guide for monetary policy.9 The exchange rate is the
price of one unit of domestic currency in terms of a foreign currency, or
a weighted-average of foreign currencies. A decline in the foreign
exchange value of the domestic currency (that is, a depreciation of the
domestic currency) could indicate that the risks of higher inflation have
increased. These risks of higher inflation may be traced to domestic or
foreign sources.10 For instance, depreciation of a currency could indicate
that domestic monetary policy has become more accommodative,
increasing domestic demand and inflationary pressures (Hafer). Depre-
ciation also could lead to increased foreign demand for domestically
produced goods and services (through increased exports of goods and
increased tourism) and higher import prices—each of which may lead to
higher domestic inflation. 
But the links between exchange rates and inflation are sufficiently
complicated that exchange rates may not always predict inflation well.11
Because exchange rates reflect differences in economic activity, fiscal and
monetary policies, and prices between countries, exchange rates may
not be good predictors of inflation. For instance, rather than predict an
increase in inflation, a depreciation could also suggest that weaker for-
eign growth will lead to reduced foreign demand for U.S. goods and
decreased inflationary pressures. Empirical evidence suggests that low
pass-through of exchange rate changes to consumer price inflation may,
at times, be attributed to other economic factors such as the degree of
openness of a country, unutilized capacity at home and abroad, the price
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of oil, and the wage, fiscal and monetary policies followed by the coun-
try after a large change in the exchange rate (De Grauwe and Tullio;
and Amritano, De Grauwe, and Tullio). 
Unemployment rate
While recognizing that inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the
long run, many analysts disregard measures of monetary policy and
favor instead measures of real economic activity to signal near-term
inflationary pressures. These analysts believe that the amount of eco-
nomic slack, or unutilized resources, is a key determinant of inflation.
The Phillips curve, which captures an apparent tradeoff between unem-
ployment and wage or price inflation, is the most common model link-
ing economic slack to inflation.12
The intuition behind the Phillips curve is that low unemployment
rates usually signal tight labor market conditions. Because tight labor
market conditions breed larger wage increases that might be passed on
to higher prices, low unemployment rates are expected to predict
increasing inflation.13 The flip side of this story is that high unemploy-
ment rates reflect an excess supply of workers and downward pressures
on wages and prices. The NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment) is defined as the rate of unemployment that exerts nei-
ther downward nor upward pressures on wage inflation, given expecta-
tions of price inflation.14 Thus, if the unemployment rate is above the
NAIRU, then inflation tends to decrease, and vice versa.15
Analysts are divided on whether or not Phillips curves are useful for
predicting inflation. The usefulness of Phillips curves for forecasting
inflation has been questioned for numerous reasons. Traditional esti-
mates of Phillips curves are based on an assumption that unemploy-
ment is dominated by aggregate demand disturbances (King and
Watson). When subject to hard-to-estimate supply shocks, such as oil
price shocks or changes in trend productivity, inflation predictions of
simple Phillips curves are likely to be poor. Even in the absence of sup-
ply shocks, because the NAIRU is unobserved, it must be estimated for
the Phillips curve to be a useful forecasting model of inflation. Unfortu-
nately, not only are estimates of the NAIRU imprecise, but they have
changed over time.16 Some analysts hold an even stronger view that the
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NAIRU has never had any sound basis in theory and has not found sup-
port in the historical data (Eisner).17 Finally, some analysts challenge the
usefulness of the Phillips curve by pointing to persistent increases in
European unemployment rates for a sustained period after the high-
inflation 1970s or to episodes in the United States where the Phillips
curve relationship did not hold.18
Despite the many criticisms of the Phillips curve, many analysts
continue to use versions of Phillips curves to predict inflation.19 In
response to criticisms that the relationship may be less reliable in the
presence of supply shocks, models are modified to account for such
shocks (Gordon 1982, 1998). In response to criticisms that the NAIRU
may not be constant, due to, say, demographic changes or structural
forces affecting the labor market, time-varying estimates of the NAIRU
are provided (Blanchard and Katz; Weiner). In response to persistent
increases in European unemployment rates, a theory to explain such
persistence was born.20
While most analysts focus on the level of the unemployment rate as a
predictor of inflation changes, Phillips also suggested that the change in the
unemployment rate may help predict inflation changes.21 In fact, Moore
suggests that the level of the unemployment rate is less important than the
direction of change of the unemployment rate for predicting inflation.
Inflation tends to increase when the unemployment rate is falling, and
inflation tends to decrease when the unemployment rate is rising.
Economic growth
Another measure of real economic activity that might predict infla-
tion is economic growth. Strong real economic activity is usually associ-
ated with strong growth in aggregate demand. Some analysts argue
that strong growth in aggregate demand indicates that inflation will
likely increase. Because periods of strong growth tend to have falling
unemployment rates and periods of weak growth tend to have rising
unemployment rates, a view that real growth may predict changes in
inflation is similar to the view expressed earlier that changes in the
unemployment rate may predict changes in inflation.22
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For example, frictions associated with expansion of productive capi-
tal imply that generally strong output growth may indicate a pickup in
inflationary pressures. Consider a shock that induces a larger than
expected increase in demand. Increasing production to meet increasing
demand at minimal cost generally requires increases in both capital and
labor inputs. However, adjusting some forms of new productive capital,
such as building new plants or assembling and installing new equip-
ment, typically takes time. Consequently, rapid expansion of production
in the short run is accomplished by increasing labor and those forms of
capital that can be adjusted quickly. As this is not the most economical
way to expand production, in the short run, production costs and, con-
sequently, prices will increase. In addition, the increase in employment
will imply increased income to workers and stronger consumer demand. 
Strong economic growth, however, may be an imperfect indicator of
increasing inflation. Strong growth due to a positive supply shock, such
as an increase in trend labor productivity growth, is unlikely to signal
an increase in inflation. Likewise, sustainable demographic changes,
such as increased immigration flows or other sources of faster popula-
tion growth, lead to stronger sustainable rates of economic growth
without increased inflationary pressures. 
In theory, a number of these potential indicators might be expected to
predict inflation. Whether it is helpful to use these indicators, of course,
depends on how well they actually predict inflation. To evaluate their effec-
tiveness, this article compares the accuracy of inflation forecasts based on
each of the indicators. The next section discusses the methodology.
II. EVALUATING THE INDICATORS
This section provides details on how the forecasts made by the set of
inflation indicators discussed in the last section will be constructed and
evaluated. The discussion focuses on the horizons at which the informa-
tion content of the indicators will be compared, the specification of the
forecasting models, and the out-of-sample evaluation procedure.
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Forecast horizons
The ability of the indicators to predict inflation is evaluated at both
one-year and two-year horizons. It is important to consider two differ-
ent forecast horizons because some indicators may contain information
more relevant in the immediate future, whereas others may contain
information more relevant at an intermediate horizon. 
It is also important to extend the analysis beyond the standard one-
year horizon because monetary policy actions have effects with long and
variable lags. One to two years often pass before inflation actually
responds to a policy adjustment (Freedman). Moreover, a two-year hori-
zon also conforms closely to the one-to-two-year inflation-target hori-
zons of the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada.
The forecasting models
This article uses simple forecasting models to assess the ability of an
indicator to predict inflation. The models relate future inflation to cur-
rent inflation and the indicator. The one-year-ahead forecasts are the
sum of a constant, current inflation, and a coefficient multiplied by the
current value of the candidate variable. The two-year-ahead forecasts
are also the sum of a constant, current inflation, and a coefficient multi-
plied by the current value of the candidate variable. Separate models are
estimated for one-year and two-year-ahead forecasts for each country.23
One appealing feature of the specification is that it corresponds to a
simple Phillips curve model when the candidate variable is the unem-
ployment rate.24
Taking this approach, each indicator’s ability to predict inflation is
assessed individually. Potential indicators are evaluated one at a time
because the article seeks to establish whether a simple parsimonious
forecasting model based on a single indicator can reliably forecast infla-
tion. The one-at-a-time approach is also used for a second reason—sim-
ple models often predict better than less parsimonious models.25
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Out-of-sample evaluation
This article uses an out-of-sample procedure to evaluate how well
indicators predict inflation. The key property of out-of-sample proce-
dures is that forecasts are based on models estimated using only the
data available at the time of the forecast. This property may character-
ize the approach followed by analysts in real time. In making forecasts,
analysts tend to update their forecasting models as more recent data
become available. For instance, if in the fourth quarter of 1993 a one-
year or two-year forecast was made (that is, a forecast of inflation in the
fourth quarter of 1994 or the fourth quarter of 1995), then the forecast
model would be estimated using data extending no later than the fourth
quarter of 1993. 
Forecast performance over 1991 through 1998 is summarized using
the root mean squared error (RMSE) of forecast errors, a measure com-
monly used to evaluate forecasts. The smaller the RMSE, the better the
forecast, and the larger the RMSE, the worse the forecast (Box). 
A benchmark for comparing the forecasts is a naïve forecast. The
naïve forecast predicts that future inflation will equal current inflation,
regardless of the horizon of the forecast or any other information. In
out-of-sample evaluations, forecasts that use information from a second
variable in addition to current inflation can perform worse than a naïve
forecast. In fact, as will be seen below, this is not uncommon. Clearly, a
variable that leads to a worse forecast than the naïve forecast would not
be helpful in forecasting inflation.
III. RESULTS
This section shows how well the various indicators predict inflation.
The empirical results help evaluate whether policymakers should moni-
tor the signals from a broad range of indicators. The results help answer
two related questions: First, do any of the indicators consistently fail to
help predict inflation? If so, then dropping them from a list of variables
to be monitored might be justified. Second, which, if any, of the indica-
tors consistently helps predict inflation? If one indicator consistently
provides precise inflation predictions, then focusing on it to the exclu-
sion of the other indicators might be justified. There is also a reason to
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OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECAST EVALUATION
The process for evaluating forecasts begins by creating a series of fore-
casts and implied forecast errors. The three-stage process is described below
for one-year-ahead forecasts. In the first stage, data from 1975 through the
first quarter of 1990 are used to estimate a forecasting model for each indi-
cator. In the second stage, each estimated model is used to create a forecast
of inflation over the next four quarters, that is, over the four quarters end-
ing in the first quarter of 1991. In the third stage, the forecast errors are
recorded as the difference between actual inflation over the four quarters
ending in the first quarter of 1991 and the forecasts. This process is then
repeated, adding an additional quarter of data to the sample used to esti-
mate the models and advancing the forecast period ahead one quarter. In
other words, in the next repetition the models are estimated using data
through the second quarter of 1990 and forecast over the four quarters
ending in the second quarter of 1991. The process repeats until forecast
errors are calculated for every quarter from the first quarter of 1991
through the fourth quarter of 1998. Series of two-year-ahead forecasts and
forecast errors are created in a similar fashion.*
Indicators are ranked by their ability to generate forecasts of inflation
close to actual inflation. The root mean squared error (RMSE) of the fore-
cast errors provides a measure of how close the forecast is to actual infla-
tion, with larger RMSEs indicating that inflation forecasts are further from
actual inflation. RMSEs are calculated for each series of forecast errors by
first squaring the forecast errors, then averaging the squared errors over the
out-of-sample evaluation interval, and finally taking the square root of the
average. The out-of-sample evaluation interval is the first quarter of 1991
through the fourth quarter of 1998.
* For each model estimated for two-year ahead forecasts, one year less of data is used at
the end of the sample compared to when models were estimated for one-year-ahead forecasts.
For example, to generate forecasts for the first quarter of 1991, data through the first quarter
of 1990 is used to estimate the forecasting models used to generate one-year-ahead forecasts,
but only data through the first quarter of 1989 is used to generate two-year-ahead forecasts.
As was the case for one-year-ahead forecasts, forecast errors are calculated for every quarter
from the first quarter of 1991 through the fourth quarter of 1998.
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look for consistency in the ability of an indicator to predict inflation
across countries. If such an indicator exists, it may be a more reliable
predictor of inflation in different economic environments within a single
country and therefore increase confidence in the indicator. 
Exploring the ability of an indicator to predict inflation over a lim-
ited time period, but across multiple countries, might also be seen as a
proxy for exploring the ability of an indicator to predict inflation over a
long time period in a single country. While some shocks, such as oil
price shocks, may hit all countries at once, the more likely occurrence is
that different countries will be affected by different shocks in a given
decade. Consequently, if an indicator is a good predictor of inflation
across a collection of countries, then it might be more likely to be a
good predictor of inflation in a single country as its economic environ-
ment changes.
The empirical results suggest that there is considerable heterogene-
ity across countries in the ability of indicators to predict inflation. One
implication of the heterogeneity is that a considerable narrowing of the
list of indicators is not justified. Almost all of the indicators performed
well for at least one horizon in one country. A second implication is that
even the indicator that predicts inflation with the most consistency does
so with insufficient precision to justify singling it out. In other words,
the empirical results justify the standard central bank policy of monitor-
ing the information contained in a broad range of indicators. 
International results
The potential inflation indicators are listed in Table 1. Variables are
grouped under the headings as used in the first section of this article
where the variables were motivated. (Since the precise definition of the
series differs somewhat across countries, a more detailed description of
the data series, including the source of the series, is provided in the
appendix.) The list in Table 1 is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely
sufficiently broad to be able to reasonably assess regularities in the
empirical results. 
General results on forecast performance are summarized by country
in Table 2. For each country, and for both one-year and two-year fore-
cast horizons, this table provides the RMSE of the best forecast, the
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Table 1
CANDIDATE INDICATORS
Interest rates Short-term interest rate
Real short-term interest rate
Spread 
Long-term interest rate
Change in long-term interest rate
Money 1-year money growth
2-year money growth
1-year change in money growth
2-year change in money growth
Money growth - GDP growth (1-year growth rates)
Money growth - GDP growth (2-year growth rates)
Exchange rate Exchange rate
1-year change in exchange rate
2-year change in exchange rate
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate
1-year change in unemployment rate
2-year change in unemployment rate
Output growth 1-year GDP growth
2-year GDP growth
Change in GDP growth
Table 2
PERFORMANCE OF THE BEST, WORST,
AND NAÏVE FORECASTS (RMSE)
One-year-ahead forecasts Two-year-ahead forecasts
Best Naïve Worst Best Naïve Worst
Australia 1.76 1.96 2.42 2.31 2.58 3.31
Canada 1.35 1.91 2.18 .88 1.79 2.61
France .47 .61 1.22 .55 .84 2.80
Germany 1.29 1.29 2.02 1.30 1.98 2.68
Italy .95 1.27 2.05 1.31 1.82 3.51
Japan 1.02 1.24 1.99 1.29 1.50 3.17
Netherlands .64 .66 1.03 .41 .63 1.32
Sweden 3.01 3.08 4.44 2.07 2.40 3.31
Switzerland .89 1.35 1.92 1.39 1.86 4.58
UK 1.10 1.46 2.00 1.37 2.10 3.51
U.S. .32 .49 .78 .35 .71 1.27
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RMSE of the naïve forecast, and the RMSE of the worst forecast. The
lower the RMSE is, the closer the forecast is to actual inflation and, con-
sequently, the better the forecast. 
Comparing the best and worst forecasts to the naïve forecast reveals
two immediate results. First, for some countries, the best forecast is not
much better than a naïve forecast. For the Netherlands and Sweden, the
best forecast of inflation at a one-year horizon is less than a tenth of a
percentage point better than the naïve forecast. In the case of the
Netherlands, the low RMSE of the naïve forecast suggests that this may
be because inflation was relatively stable in the 1990s. However, in
Sweden, the high RMSE indicates this was not the case.26
Second, an indicator can actually generate a worse forecast than a
naïve forecast. In all countries, at least one indicator generated an infla-
tion forecast that performed worse than the naïve forecast. In fact, for
Germany, no indicator improves on the naïve one-year forecast. One
explanation for this poor performance may be the length of the evalua-
tion interval. In particular, if changes in inflation were due to different
shocks in different years, then a single indicator may not forecast infla-
tion well on average. 
Rankings of inflation indicators by countries support the practice of
looking at signals from a broad range of indicators. The best and worst
inflation indicators as ranked by lowest RMSE are in Tables 3a and 3b.
Table 3a contains a list for one-year-ahead forecasts and Table 3b con-
tains a list for two-year-ahead forecasts. All but two of the candidate
variables appear among the best three indicators for at least one horizon
in one country. And, the two indicators that do not appear in best-three
lists, 1-year money growth and money growth - GDP growth (2-year growth
rates), are variations on two indicators that do appear in best-three lists,
2-year money growth and money growth - GDP growth (1-year growth rates).
Thus, the results do not justify a considerable narrowing of the list of
indicators and support examining of a broad range of indicators.
The table clearly reveals considerable heterogeneity. No one indica-
tor performs best in all 11 countries. Furthermore, indicators that per-
form well in some countries often perform poorly in others.27
Nevertheless, some regularities are apparent. 
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Table 3a
BEST AND WORST INFLATION INDICATORS
BY COUNTRY
(ONE-YEAR-AHEAD FORECASTS)
Best three indicators Worst three indicators
Australia 1. Change in GDP growth 21. 2-year change in unemployment rate
2. 1-year change in money growth 20. 1-year GDP growth
3. 2-year money growth 19. 2-year GDP growth
Canada 1. 1-year change in unemployment rate 21. 1-year money growth
2. 2-year change in unemployment rate 20. Money growth -  GDP growth (2 years)
3. 1-year change in exchange rate 19. Money growth -  GDP growth (1 year)
France 1. 1-year change in exchange rate 21. 2-year GDP growth 
2. Change in long-term interest rate 20. Short-term interest rate
3. Exchange rate 19. Long-term interest rate
Germany 1. Naïve 21. 2-year money growth
2. 2-year change in unemployment rate 20. Long-term interest rate
3. 1-year change in unemployment rate 19. Short-term interest rate 
Italy 1. Change in GDP growth 21. 2-year change in exchange rate
2. 2-year GDP growth 20. Short-term interest rate
3. Spread 19. 1-year change in unemployment rate
Japan 1. 1-year change in exchange rate 21. 1-year GDP growth
2. Change in GDP growth 20. 2-year change in money growth
3. Spread 19. Short-term interest rate
Netherlands 1. 2-year change in exchange rate 21. Change in long-term interest rate
2. Change in GDP growth 20. Spread
3. 1-year change in money growth 19. Real short-term interest rate
Sweden 1. Change in GDP growth 21. 1-year change in unemployment rate
2. Real short-term interest rate 20. Unemployment rate
3. Naïve 19. 2-year change in unemployment rate 
Switzerland 1. Change in long-term interest rate 21. Exchange rate
2. 1-year GDP growth 20. 2-year change in unemployment rate
3. 2-year GDP growth 19. Real short-term interest rate
UK 1. 1-year change in money growth 21. Long-term interest rate
2. Short-term interest rate 20. Spread
3. 2-year change in money growth 19. Real short-term interest rate
U.S. 1. 1-year GDP growth 21. Money growth -  GDP growth (2 years)
2. Change in long-term interest rate 20. Money growth -  GDP growth (1 years)
3. Real short-term interest rate 19. 2-year change in money growth
Kozicki.qxd  9/6/01  3:33 PM  Page 1920 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In Table 3a, the change in GDP growth appears in the best-three lists of
five countries but in none of the worst-three lists. Similarly, the 1-year
change in money growth is in the best-three lists of three countries, but in
none of the worst-three lists. By contrast, the long-term interest rate is
absent from the best-three lists of all countries but appears in the worst-
three lists of several countries. Most of the remaining indicators appear in
the best-three lists of some countries and in the worst-three lists of others.
In Table 3b, the change in GDP growth, the change in the long-term
interest rate, the 1-year change in money growth, and the 2-year change in
money growth appear in the best-three lists of several countries, but in
none of the worst-three lists. As was the case for one-year-ahead fore-
casts, the long-term interest rate appears in the worst-three lists of several
countries. In addition, the exchange rate is absent from the best-three
lists of all countries, but does appear in some worst-three lists.
The evidence suggests some consistency across countries in terms of
an indicator that may be useful for predicting inflation. The change in
GDP growth helps predict inflation in many different countries, suggest-
ing that it might be a good indicator in different economic environments. 
Another way to rank the inflation indicators is by average perform-
ance across the 11 countries. Table 4 presents the average RMSEs over
the countries and ranks indicators with lower average RMSEs higher.
Indicators with higher rankings provide better predictions of inflation
more consistently than indicators with lower rankings. The results in
Table 4 confirm what was suggested by the rankings in Table 3. In par-
ticular, on average, at both one-year and two-year forecast horizons, the
change in GDP growth provides the best predictions of inflation. 
Although the change in GDP growth receives the top ranking in for
both one-year and two-year-ahead forecasts, the empirical results do not
justify considering its inflation predictions to the exclusion of those
based on other indicators. While this is the most consistent indicator, it
only improves forecasts on average by at most a tenth of a percentage
point relative to naïve forecasts. Individual country results suggest that
considerably more precise forecasts could be achieved using a different
indicator in some economic environments.
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Table 3b
BEST AND WORST INFLATION INDICATORS
BY COUNTRY
(TWO-YEAR-AHEAD FORECASTS)
Best three indicators Worst three indicators
Australia 1. Unemployment rate 21. 1-year change in unemployment rate
2. Short-term interest rate 20. 2-year GDP growth
3. Spread 19. 1-year GDP growth 
Canada 1. 1-year change in unemployment rate 21. 1-year money growth
2. 2-year change in unemployment rate  20. Long-term interest rate
3. Change in GDP growth 19. Short-term interest rate
France 1. 2-year change in money growth 21. 2-year GDP growth
2. Change in GDP growth 20. Long-term interest rate
3. Change in long-term interest rate 19. 1-year GDP growth
Germany 1. 1-year change in unemployment rate 21. Long-term interest rate
2. 2-year GDP growth 20. 2-year money growth
3. 2-year change in unemployment rate 19. 1-year money growth
Italy 1. Change in long-term interest rate 21. Short-term interest rate
2. 2-year change in money growth 20. 2-year change in exchange rate
3. Money growth -  GDP growth (1 year) 19. 1-year change in exchange rate
Japan 1. Spread 21. Exchange rate
2. Change in GDP growth 20. Short-term interest rate
3. Naïve 19. 1-year GDP growth
Netherlands 1. 2-year change in exchange rate 21. Spread
2. 2-year money growth 20. Real short-term interest rate
3. 2-year change in money growth 19. 2-year change in unemployment rate
Sweden 1. 2-year GDP growth 21. 1-year change in unemployment rate
2. 2-year money growth 20. Long-term interest rate
3. Real short-term interest rate 19. Unemployment rate
Switzerland 1. 1-year GDP growth 21. 2-year change in unemployment rate
2. Short-term interest rate 20. Exchange rate
3. Long-term interest rate 19. Unemployment rate
UK 1. 1-year change in money growth 21. Long-term interest rate
2. Exchange rate 20. 2-year GDP growth
3. 2-year change in money growth 19. Short-term interest rate
U.S. 1. 2-year money growth 21. Money growth -  GDP growth (2 years)
2. Change in GDP growth 20. Money growth -  GDP growth (1 year)
3. Change in long-term interest rate 19. Long-term interest rate
Kozicki.qxd  9/6/01  3:33 PM  Page 2122 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Table 4
INDICATOR RANKINGS 
(BASED ON LOWEST AVERAGE RMSE
ACROSS COUNTRIES)
Forecast horizon Indicator Average RMSE
One-year-ahead Change in GDP growth 1.35
Naïve 1.39
1-year change in exchange rate 1.42
1-year change in money growth 1.42
Change in long-term interest rate 1.44
2-year money growth 1.47
Money growth -  GDP growth (1 year) 1.50
Real short-term interest rate 1.50
Spread 1.51
Money growth -  GDP growth (2 years) 1.52
1-year money growth 1.53
Exchange rate 1.53
2-year change in exchange rate 1.54
1-year GDP growth 1.54
2-year change in money growth 1.55
Short-term interest rate 1.58
Unemployment rate 1.58
1-year change in unemployment rate 1.59
2-year GDP growth 1.59
2-year change in unemployment rate 1.61
Long-term interest rate 1.66
Two-years ahead Change in GDP growth 1.55
1-year change in money growth 1.64
Naïve 1.65
Spread 1.70
Change in long-term interest rate 1.70
2-year change in money growth 1.76
2-year money growth 1.80
1-year change in exchange rate 1.81
Money growth -  GDP growth (1 year) 1.81
Money growth -  GDP growth (2 years) 1.81
Real short-term interest rate 1.82
1-year money growth 1.84
Unemployment rate 1.86
2-year change in exchange rate 1.91
1-year change in unemployment rate 1.91
Exchange rate 1.92
1-year GDP growth 1.93
2-year GDP growth 2.08
2-year change in unemployment rate 2.13
Short-term interest rate 2.27
Long-term interest rate 2.29
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Results for the United States
For the United States, several indicators provide considerably better
forecasts of inflation than a naïve forecast. Although not identical, rank-
ings of the indicators based on RMSEs for one-year forecasts are similar
to those based on RMSEs for two-year forecasts. Consequently, indica-
tors are ranked in Table 5 by the lowest average RMSE over the two
forecast horizons. Inflation forecasts based on all the exchange rate indi-
cators are better than the naïve forecast. Indicators based on nominal
interest rate levels (that is, the short-term interest rate and the long-term
interest rate) perform poorly, although the other interest rate indicators
perform quite well. And, with the exception of the unemployment rate,
indicators that measure real economic activity tend to predict inflation
well. By contrast, the performance of inflation predictions based on
money indicators varies widely, with some forecasts considerably better
than the naïve forecast and others considerably worse. An important
caveat to the results is that RMSE provides only limited information on
forecast performance. Other information may be needed to assess fore-
cast reliability (Box). 
Why do results differ across countries?
Although the empirical evidence suggests a certain degree of consis-
tency for a few inflation indicators, in the 1990s different indicators
helped predict inflation in different countries. In fact, monitoring sig-
nals from a wide range of indicators is likely worthwhile precisely
because most indicators were good predictors of inflation in at least one
economic environment. Differences across countries in economic struc-
ture, economic experiences, and monetary policy procedures may help
explain why in a given period an indicator might predict inflation well
in some countries but be largely useless in others.
One explanation for heterogeneity across countries in the perform-
ance of some inflation indicators is differences in economic structure.
Economic structure refers to characteristics of the economy that tend to
change only slowly, if at all. The relationship between inflation indica-
tors and inflation may depend on such structural characteristics. For
example, differences in labor market structure across countries may
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influence the relationship—if one exists—between inflation and either
the unemployment rate or the change in the rate. Countries like Japan
and Germany have less flexible labor markets historically than countries
with fewer traditions of lifelong employment and less regulated labor
markets like the United States. A second example is the differing
degrees of openness of the countries. The exchange rate might be
expected to be a better predictor of inflation in countries such as Canada
or Australia where trade is a large share of economic activity. 
A second explanation for heterogeneity across countries is differ-
ences in economic experiences in the 1990s. Economic experiences refer
to shocks to economic conditions. Some indicators may do a good job at
predicting the inflationary consequences of specific types of shocks.
Consequently, if the size, frequency, and type of shocks faced by coun-
tries differ, it is likely that the forecasting performance of indicators will
Table 5
FORECAST PERFORMANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES




Change in long-term interest rate .37 .38 .38
2-year money growth .40 .35 .38
1-year GDP growth .32 .49 .41
Spread .38 .45 .41
Change in GDP growth .46 .37 .42
1-year change in exchange rate .38 .50 .44
Real short-term interest rate .37 .53 .45
2-year change in exchange rate .44 .48 .46
1-year change in unemployment rate .42 .53 .48
Exchange rate .44 .53 .49
2-year GDP growth .46 .56 .51
1-year money growth .51 .54 .52
1-year change in money growth .45 .60 .53
2-year change in unemployment rate .48 .64 .56
Naïve .49 .71 .60
Unemployment rate .58 .71 .65
2-year change in money growth .61 .88 .75
Short-term interest rate .46 1.04 .75
Long-term interest rate .60 1.18 .89
Money growth -  GDP growth (1 year) .62 1.25 .93
Money growth -  GDP growth (2 years) .77 1.27 1.02
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ARE LOW-RMSE FORECASTS RELIABLE?
Some indicators with a low RMSE might not provide reliable forecasts.
Information other than RMSE can be used to assess reliability. The discus-
sion in the first section suggested not only which variables might help pre-
dict inflation, but also how inflation is likely to be related to the variables.
Inflation predictions might be regarded as unreliable if information on the
estimated direction of predicted changes in inflation are inconsistent with
the expected relationship, or, if estimated directions change within the
evaluation sample.
Columns with information on the estimated direction of predicted
changes in inflation are included in the table for U.S. data to assess the reli-
ability of the various inflation forecasts. The columns labeled one-year direc-
tion and two-year direction provide the direction predicted by the estimated
model for one-year and two-year-ahead forecasts of inflation, respectively.
Entries that contain “+” signify that if the indicator rises (falls), then infla-
tion will rise (fall) from current levels. Entries that contain “-” signify that
if the indicator rises (falls), then inflation will fall (rise) from current levels.
If an entry contains “+/-” then the estimated direction changed within the
1991:Q1 to 1998:Q4 evaluation interval. Since a naïve forecast predicts no
change in inflation, its estimated direction is recorded as “0.”
Using this approach, several of the top-ranked inflation predictors
turn out to be unreliable. At the one-year horizon, the estimated direction
is unstable for the change in the long-term interest rate and 2-year money
growth and is contrary to the expected direction for the spread and the change
in GDP growth. At the two-year horizon, the estimated direction is unstable
for the change in GDP growth and contrary to expectations for the change in
the long-term interest rate. Nevertheless, several variables provide inflation
forecasts that are better than the naïve forecast and appear to be reliable. In
particular, predictions based on GDP growth, exchange rate variables, and
the changes in the unemployment rate are in the expected direction, and
with lower RMSEs than the naïve model.
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differ considerably across countries. Some indicators may lose their abil-
ity to predict inflation, however, if structural changes in a country alter
the historical relationships between the indicators and inflation.
The economic experiences of the countries examined differed consid-
erably in the 1990s. The Asian crisis in 1997 is an example of a large
shock—one that affected economic activity in Japan more negatively
than other countries. Effects of the Asian crisis on other countries dif-
fered. Whereas the Australian and Canadian dollars depreciated consid-
ESTIMATED DIRECTION OF PREDICTED
INFLATION CHANGES FOR THE U.S.
(RANKED BY LOWEST AVERAGE RMSE)
One-year Two-year Average
direction direction RMSE
Change in long-term interest rate +/-- .38
2-year money growth +/- + .38
1-year GDP growth + + .41
Spread - + .41
Change in GDP growth - +/- .42
1-year change in exchange rate -- .44
Real short-term interest rate -- .45
2-year change in exchange rate -- .46
1-year change in unemployment rate -- .48
Exchange rate -- .49
2-year GDP growth + + .51
1-year money growth - +/- .52
1-year change in money growth -- .53
2-year change in unemployment rate -- .56
Naïve 0 0 .60
Unemployment rate -- .65
2-year change in money growth -- .75
Short-term interest rate -- .75
Long-term interest rate -- .89
Money growth -  GDP growth (1 year) -- .93
Money growth -  GDP growth (2 years) --1.02
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erably as a sizable market for their natural resources fizzled, the U.S. dol-
lar appreciated strongly with safe haven flows. The breakdown of the
Euopean Monetary System and then the drive to European Monetary
Union likely affected economic activity in Europe. Four of the eleven
countries examined in this study—France, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands—were in the first group of countries to adopt the euro.
However, convergence pressures also may have affected economic condi-
tions in other European countries, particularly Sweden and the United
Kingdom, that may adopt the euro at a later date. Changes in tax policy
provide examples of shocks that directly affected inflation in Canada.
The introduction of the goods and services tax and large changes in taxes
imposed on tobacco caused considerable year-to-year variation in Con-
sumer Price Index inflation in Canada in the 1990s. Such variation
would not have been predicted by the indicators examined in this article.
A third explanation for heterogeneity across countries is differences
in monetary policy procedures. Central banks may react to different
sources of economic information. Suppose, for example, that sustained
increases in money growth lead to increases in inflation. Some central
banks may respond to changes in money growth while others may not.
A central bank may tighten policy in reaction to an increase in money
growth, anticipating that if no action is taken, inflation will increase.
However, the mere fact that a central bank responds to the monetary
signal may make the ex post relationship between money growth and
inflation disappear—every time money growth picks up, policy
responds to bring it back down, and inflation is not affected. Paradoxi-
cally, money growth may provide more information on future inflation
in countries where central banks do not react to money growth. The
same paradox can arise with other indicators.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article examines whether any single indicator reliably predicts
inflation. If one indicator consistently forecasts inflation well under a
wide range of economic conditions and changing economic structures,
then central banks might want to focus on the inflation signals it pro-
vides and narrow the range of indicators they monitor. 
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Results from a country-by-country analysis suggest that in most
countries non-trivial improvements over naïve inflation forecasts can be
made with the help of several indicators. However, only one indicator,
the change in GDP growth, improved on naïve inflation forecasts on
average across all 11 countries—but the improvement was small. 
These empirical results provide support for an approach to policy-
making that involves collecting, monitoring, and analyzing a wide
range of economic indicators. The results suggest that focusing atten-
tion too narrowly on one or a few indicators could be risky since the
ability of any given indicator to predict inflation varies across different
economic environments.
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APPENDIX
When raw data were reported monthly, “raw” quarterly series were
constructed as the average over the quarter of the three monthly obser-
vations. Observations for other series in quarter t were constructed from
the raw quarterly series as follows:
Inflation (t) = log(Consumer Price Index (t)) -  log(Consumer Price Index (t-4));
Real short-term interest rate = Short-term interest rate (t) -  Inflation (t);
Spread (t) = long-term interest rate (t) -  short-term interest rate (t).
For any variable x, changes, 1-year changes, 1-year growth rates,
and 2-year growth rates were calculated as:
Change in x (t) = x (t) -  x (t-4)
1-year change in x (t) = x (t) -  x (t-4)
2-year change in x (t) = x (t) -  x (t-8)
1-year growth of x (t) = log( x (t) ) -  log( x (t-4) )
2-year growth of x (t) = (1/2) ( log( x (t) ) -  log( x (t-8) ) ).
The raw data series are described below by country.
Australia
Short-term interest rate (Short Rate) — Weighted average yield on 13-
week Treasury notes. Missing observation in October 1997 replaced with
average of observations for September 1997 and November 1997. Source:
International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (IFS). 
Long-term interest rate (Long Rate) — Assessed secondary market
yields on nonrebate bonds with maturity of at least 10 years. Source: IFS. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) — Source: IFS. 
Exchange Rate (Ex) — Australian $ / U.S.$, Source: Board of Gover-
nors (BOG). 
Unemployment Rate (U) — Source: Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) — 1996-1997 prices, Australian dol-
lars Source: IFS. 
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Money Supply (M) — M3, millions of Australian dollars. Source:
Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Canada
Short Rate — Weighted average of the yields on successful bids for
3-month bills. Source: IFS. 
Long Rate — Secondary market, average bond yields on Govern-
ment of Canada bonds over 10 years. Source: IFS. 
CPI — Source: IFS. 
Ex — Weighted average exchange rates of the Canadian dollar,
weighted by G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Source: Statistics Canada. 
GDP — Real, Canadian dollars. Source: Statistics Canada. 
M — M2Plus, Newly defined 1/92 to include money market
mutual funds, millions of Canadian dollars. Source: Bank of Canada. 
France
Short Rate — 3-month Paris interbank offer rate. Break in January
1987: Previously rates practiced on money market (pensions between
banks). Source: BIS. 
Long Rate — Secondary market yield, public and semi-public
bonds. Missing observation in April 1974 replaced with average of
observations for March 1974 and May 1974. Missing observation in
March 1979 replaced with average of observations for February 1979
and April 1979. Source: BIS. 
CPI — Source: IFS. 
Ex  — Weighted average exchange rates of the French franc,
weighted by G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Source: INSEE. 
GDP — Billions of 1980 francs. Source: INSEE. 
M — M3, new definition December 1990 billions of francs. Source:
Bank of France. 
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Germany
Short Rate — Frankfurt 3-month interbank loan rate. Source: BOG. 
Long Rate — From January 1961 through December 1982 and for
June 1983 data is for 7-15 year public sector bonds. Source: BIS. From
January 1983 through December 1997, excluding June 1983, data are
the yield on German Government Bellwether bond. Source: BOG. 
CPI — Data cover the former Federal Republic of Germany prior to
1991. Data cover the former Federal Republic of Germany and the for-
mer German Democratic Republic from 1991 onward. Source: IFS. 
Ex — Weighted average exchange rates of the deutsche mark,
weighted by G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Western Germany unemployment rate. Source: Deutsche
Bundesbank. 
GDP — Real, billions of deustche marks. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank. 
M — M3 equal to M2 + savings deposits at statutory notice, end
of month, billions of deustche marks. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Italy
Short Rate — Average of the allotment rates at public auction of
ordinary Treasury bills (compound yield) gross of tax. Source: BIS. Miss-
ing observations February 1979 through October 1979 are 3-month
interbank rate. Source: IFS. 
Long Rate — Yields to maturity of fixed-coupon Treasury bonds
with residual maturities between 9 and 10 years. Prior to 1991, yields
to maturity on bonds with original maturities of 15 to 20 years, issued
on behalf of the Treasury by the Consortium of Credit for Public Works.
Source: IFS. 
CPI — Source: IFS. 
Ex — Weighted average exchange rates of the Italian lira, weighted
by G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Source: ISTAT. 
GDP — 1995 prices. Source: BIS. 
M — M2 monthly average, billions of lira. Source: BIS.
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Japan
Short Rate — Yields of bonds trading with repurchase agreement
(3-month). Rates are those offered by clients to securities companies.
Source: BIS. 
Long Rate — yield at issue, to subscribers on 10-year interest bear-
ing government bonds (prior to January 1973, 7-year). Source: BIS. 
CPI — Source: IFS. 
Ex — Weighted average exchange rates of the Japanese yen,
weighted by G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Source: Economic Planning Agency of Japan. 
GDP — Billions of 1990 yen. Source: Economic Planning Agency
of Japan. 
M — M2 includes CDs. Monthly average measure, Note: Data prior
to Jan. 1986 have been computed from percent changes; these com-
puted data are imprecise. Billions of yen. Source: U.S. State Department. 
Netherlands
Short Rate — 3-month Amsterdam interbank offer rates (monthly
average) based on offer rates of seven banks. Prior to December 1985,
interbank deposit rate. Source: BIS. 
Long Rate — Yield on most recent 10-year government bond.
Source: IFS. 
CPI — Source: IFS. 
Ex — Weighted average exchange rates of the guilder, weighted by
G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — 3-month uncentered moving average. Source: Central Bureau
of Statistics. 
GDP — Billions of 1995 guilders. Source: BIS. 
M — M2 National Concept reported until December 1997. From
Jan 1998 on, use M3 National Concept, billions of guilders. Source: BIS.
Sweden
Short Rate — Rate on 3-month Treasury discount notes. Source: IFS. 
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Long Rate — Starting in December 1986: data are secondary mar-
ket yield on 9-year or 10-year government bonds. From January 1994,
9-year government bonds. Source: BIS. Data prior to December 1986:
Until December 1979 data refer to yields on government bonds matur-
ing in 15 years, For January 1980 through November 1986 data refer
to yields on bonds maturing in 10 years. Source: IFS. 
CPI — Source: IFS. 
Ex — Weighted average exchange rates of the krona, weighted by
G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Source: Haver. 
GDP — Billions of 1995 kroner. Source: Haver. 
M — M3 equal to M1 + quasi money, billions of kroner. Source: BIS. 
Switzerland
Short Rate — Time deposits, 3-month, with large banks. Data prior
to June 1989 applied by agreement by 4 main banks (fixed deposit con-
vention). Source: BIS. 
Long Rate — Secondary market yield on Confederation bonds. Until
December 1981: all loans with remaining maturity of between 5 and 12
years. From January 1982 onwards, all loans with at least 5 years to
maturity and at least 3 years to first call date. Source: BIS. 
CPI — Source: IFS. 
Ex  — Weighted average exchange rates of the Swiss franc,
weighted by G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Source: Reuters—Federal Department of Public Economics. 
GDP — Billions of 1995 francs. Source: Haver. 
M — Historical Money Supply: Adjusted central bank money,
reported until July 1992. From August 1992 on, adjusted central bank
money. Millions of Swiss francs. Source: BIS.
United Kingdom
Short Rate — Daily 3-month interbank sterling figs. Source: BOG. 
Long Rate — Theoretical gross redemption bond yields. Issue at par
with 20 years to maturity. Source: IFS. 
CPI — Source: IFS. 
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Ex — Weighted average exchange rates of the pound sterling,
weighted by G-10 countries, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Source: Department of Employment. 
GDP — Real. Source: Department of Employment. 
M — M0, billions of pounds sterling. Source: Bank of England. 
USA
Short Rate — 3-month Treasury bill secondary market rate. Source: BOG. 
Long Rate — Market yield on U.S. Treasury securities at 10-year
constant maturity. Source: BOG. 
CPI — Source: U.S. Department of Labor—Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Ex — Weighted average exchange rates of the U.S. dollar against
the other G-10 currencies, CPI-adjusted. Source: BOG. 
U — Civilian. Source: U.S. Department of Labor—Bureau of Labor
Statistics. 
GDP — Billions of chain-weighted 1996 U.S. dollars. Source: U.S.
Department of Commerce—Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
M — M2—monthly average, billions of dollars. Source: BOG.
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ENDNOTES
1 A third factor that influenced the choice of variables was a desire that the
variable be observed. To reduce the potential for criticisms that results were
affected by subjective decisions on how to transform a variable, unobservable vari-
ables and variables defined using unobserved variables were generally not consid-
ered. For example, deviations of trending series from estimates of their “potential”
growth trend, as examined by Stock and Watson (1999 and 2001), were not con-
sidered because views on how to estimate trends are not uncontroversial. One
exception to this was the decision to include a measure of the short-term real inter-
est rate. This exception was made because the proxy used for expected inflation is
very common.
2 The predictive power of the spread for future inflation has been investigated
in many articles, including Fama(1990), Mishkin (1990 and 1991), Jorion and
Mishkin (1991), Robertson (1992), Abken (1993), Blough (1994), Frankel and
Lown (1994), Engsted (1995), Estrella and Mishkin (1997a), Tzavalas and Wick-
ens (1996), Alles and Bhar (1997), Davis and Fagan (1997), Day and Lange
(1997), and Kozicki (1997). Generally, results suggest that for short horizons the
spread predicts future inflation poorly, but for longer horizons the predictive power
of the spread improves. Results, however, appear to be somewhat sensitive to the
sample period analyzed (Koedijk and Kool (1995)).
3 Goodfriend (1993) labels significant increases in long-term interest rates in
the absence of aggressive policy tightenings “inflation scares.” He argues that such
increases in long-term interest rates reflect rising expected long-run inflation.
Walsh (1998) notes that changes in long rates that follow policy actions may sig-
nal changes in the market’s assessment of future inflation. For example, a decline
in rates following a policy tightening may signal inflation is expected to decline.
4 Two recent episodes provide examples. The announcement in early 2000 by
the U.S. Treasury of reduced auction schedules and imminent buybacks provided a
negative supply shock to the Treasury market that increased the price of longer
term securities and decreased their yields. Instability of global financial markets in
late 1998 after the Russian debt default provides an example of a demand shock in
the Treasury market. Yields on Treasury bonds fell in response to huge safe-haven
flows of funds into low-risk securities. 
5 The view that monetary policymakers could use money to attain their ulti-
mate inflation objective is based on a presumed stable relationship between money
and prices. In the United States, this view was the basis for the 1976 congressional
mandate to the Federal Reserve, the Humphrey/Hawkins Act, to specify annual
targets for monetary growth (Heller). In the European Monetary Union, a refer-
ence value for the growth of a specific monetary aggregate is one of two pillars
used to achieve the goal of price stability (ECB). In addition, conducting monetary
policy with an eye to monetary growth targets is often viewed as more transparent.
Issing (1996) advocates the use of monetary targets because they increase the
transparency of the policy rule and promote a clear definition of economic policy
responsibility. 
6 Friedman (1992) provided an interesting example from the American Civil
War. “The South financed the war largely through the printing press, in the
process producing an inflation that averaged 10 percent per month from October
Kozicki.qxd  9/6/01  3:33 PM  Page 3536 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
1861 to March 1864. In an attempt to stem the inflation, the Confederacy enacted
a monetary reform” and in May 1864 the stock of money was reduced. Despite
ongoing civil, economic, and political disarray, reducing the stock of money had a
significant effect and the general price index dropped dramatically (Lerner). 
7 Examples include Darby, Mascaro, and Marlow (1989), Hafer (1993), Hall-
man, Porter, and Small (1991), Haslag and Ozment (1991), Dewald (1998), and
Crowder (1998). Although Friedman (1968) exposited a relationship between
inflation and the difference between money growth and output growth, investiga-
tions usually focus on the relationship between inflation and money growth, per-
haps because “what happens to money tends to dwarf what happens to output”
(Friedman 1992).
8 See, for instance, Friedman and Kuttner (1992 and 1996), Estrella and
Mishkin (1997b), and Sill (1999). Friedman and Kuttner (1996) argue that
increasing instability of money demand is the most consistent explanation for the
loss of predictive power of money growth. Instability in money demand may be a
response to new technology, deregulation, new forms of deposit holdings, and
globalization among other changes in economic conditions.
9 With the demise of the Bretton Woods international monetary system in
1973, some countries, such as the United States, opted for floating exchange rates
while others chose to operate under currency pegs. Eichengreen provides an inter-
national history of exchange rate policies.
10 Movements in the exchange rate have been cited as one source of increased
inflation in the U.S. in 1972 and 1973. Then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve,
Arthur Burns noted in a statement before the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency of the House of Representatives on July 30, 1974: “a worldwide boom in
economic activity during 1972 and 1973 led to a bidding up of prices every-
where.…The impact of worldwide inflation was especially severe in the U.S.
because of the decline in the exchange value of the dollar relative to other curren-
cies. Besides stimulating our export trade, and thereby reinforcing the pressures of
domestic demand on available resources, devaluation raised the dollar prices of
imported products, and these effects spread through our markets.”
11 Evidence on whether or not movements of the exchange rate predict infla-
tion is mixed. Whitt, Koch, and Rosensweig (1986) find that between April 1973
and June 1985, U.S. exchange rate movements were followed by substantial
changes in the price level. However, examining the episode of U.S. dollar deprecia-
tion between 1985 and early 1987, Kahn (1987) finds that the 40 percent depre-
ciation would likely only have a small impact on inflation, as the effect on the level
of consumer prices would be spread over several years. Furthermore, Kahn (1987)
and Hafer (1989) argue that the impact on inflation should be only temporary. In
particular, while a depreciation of the domestic currency or increase in the foreign
currency price of imports may raise the domestic price of imports, such relative
price increases will only have transitory effects on inflation unless domestic mone-
tary policy accommodates the increase in the relative price of imports. Examining
data for the G7 countries, Papell (1994) finds that exchange rate movements have
relatively small effects on national price levels. 
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12 Phillips (1958) is credited with finding a relationship between inflation and
the level of the unemployment rate and the rate of change of unemployment.
Phillips wrote that “the rate of change of money wage rates can be explained by
the level of unemployment and the rate of change of unemployment.…”
13 An alternative interpretation is that a low unemployment rate signals
excess demand in the economy. In situations of excess demand, strong demand for
scarce products bids up prices. Consequently, low unemployment may predict ris-
ing inflation.
14 The NAIRU is often referred to as the natural rate of unemployment, the
equilibrium rate of unemployment, the neutral rate of unemployment, or the full
employment rate of unemployment. While some analysts may argue that these
terms apply to slightly different concepts, they will be used interchangeably in this
article.
15 This relationship of the change in inflation to the gap between the unem-
ployment rate and the NAIRU is implied by an “accelerationist,” or expectations-
augmented, Phillips curve with past inflation used to proxy for expected inflation.
In response to critiques by Friedman (1968) and Phelps, Phillips curves were mod-
ified to so that they would not include a permanent tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment. In these modified Phillips curves, sometimes referred to as acceler-
ationist Phillips curves, inflation rises above expected inflation if the unemploy-
ment rate falls below the NAIRU and inflation falls below expected inflation if the
unemployment rate rises above the NAIRU. To understand why only temporary
tradeoffs are possible, consider a situation where unemployment is below the
NAIRU. According to the theory, tight labor market conditions lead to higher
wage increases and subsequent higher inflation. Workers, however, realize this
likelihood and build higher expectations of inflation into their wage demands.
Consequently, unemployment below the NAIRU will lead to accelerating infla-
tion. To simplify exposition, the label “accelerationist” will be dropped in the text.
See Okun (1975) and Espinosa-Vega and Russell (1997) for a review of the history
and theory of the NAIRU.
16 Tootell (1994) acknowledges that there are difficulties associated with esti-
mating the NAIRU. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997), Chang (1997), and Solow
(1998) discuss time-variation in the NAIRU and imprecision associated with esti-
mates. 
17 In particular, Eisner argues that for the U.S., while inflation appears to
decline when the unemployment is above the NAIRU, there are little or no lasting
effects on inflation when unemployment is below the NAIRU. In addition, Fair
(1999) suggests the dynamics implied by the Phillips curve are rejected.
18 As noted by Solow (1998), it is not clear that the U.S. economy before 1970
behaved in a way consistent with the accerlationist (expectations-augmented)
Phillips curve.
19 Gordon (1998), Stiglitz (1997), Fuhrer (1995), King and Watson (1994),
and Weiner (1993) are examples of recent research that is generally supportive of
Phillips curve models of inflation.
20 To account for persistence in the unemployment rate, Blanchard and Sum-
mers (1987) developed a “hysteresis” theory of the European unemployment prob-
lem. “Hysteresis” refers to the tendency of a shock to a variable to persist. Evidence
of hysteresis in unemployment was reported by Blanchard and Summers (for
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France, West Germany, and the U.K) and Brunello (for Japan). Evidence of hys-
teresis in unemployment was not supported by Canadian data according to Poloz
and Wilkinson.
21 The suggestion that the change in unemployment will help predict the
change in inflation is often referred to as a “speed effect” or “speed limit effect.”
See, for example, the discussion in Fuhrer (1995).
22 Moore (1978) concludes that not only in the U.S., but in other industrial-
ized countries, declines in the rate of inflation have almost invariably been associ-
ated with slowdowns in real economic growth and a diminution in unemployment
rates, and have not occurred at other times.
23 The basic models estimated are: inflation(t+k) = constant + inflation(t) + r¥
variable(t) + error(t), where inflation(t+k) is inflation over the four quarters ending in
quarter t+k quarters, inflation(t) is inflation over the four quarters ending in quar-
ter t, variable(t) is the measure of the candidate variable in quarter t, error(t) is the
error in the forecast, and constant and r are estimated parameters. For one-year-
ahead forecasts k=4 and for two-year-ahead forecasts k=8. Estimates of constant
and r differ for different k and for different countries. The specification of the mod-
els is similar to that used by Stock and Watson (1999 and 2001).
24 Slightly less restrictive models were also considered. The difference between
these models and the models described above is that in the less restrictive models,
current inflation is also multiplied by a coefficient to be estimated. However, as
these models generally performed slightly worse that the models described above,
the results have not been included in this article. Although more simplistic, the
specification of the less restrictive models resembles that used by Cecchetti, Chu
and Steindel (2000).
25 More general models including multiple indicators and more parameters to
be estimated often suffer from in-sample over-fitting problems. In other words,
while the models tend to explain historical data well within the sample used to
estimate the model, forecast performance out-of-sample is frequently worse than
would be obtained with a much simpler model.
26 Over 1991:Q1 through 1998:Q4, the Netherlands had the lowest variance
of inflation (0.31) and Sweden had the highest variance of inflation (8.02).
27 Stock and Watson (2001) obtained similar results in a study of the predic-
tive performance for inflation of up to 38 indicators for seven OECD countries and
two subsamples. In particular, they found that some variables forecast relatively
well in some countries in one or the other of the subsamples.
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